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Executive Summary and 
Policy Recommendation
Despite a moratorium by the Indonesian 
government rejecting new logging concessions 
since May 2011, Indonesia saw 840,000 hectares 
of forests cleared in 2012 and deforestation levels 
continue to increase at an alarming rate every year.
 
International experiences have shown that chances 
of sustainable long-term forest management 
improve when the ownership and management of 
forest resources remain with local communities. 
Once they have secured long-term access to 
resources through property rights they become 
confident enough to widen their time horizon and 
to invest in sustainable forestry practices. 
However, Indonesian forests are owned by the 
national government, which then delegates 
management rights to local levels of government. 
The ensuing struggle over control of forest 
resources between all levels of government caused 
weak legal and regulatory frameworks and a major 
barrier for sustainable forest management. 
Considering these complexities of forest governance, 
there is no simple way towards sustainable forest 
management and to the prevention of further 
deforestation. Nevertheless, several case studies 
from Indonesia and abroad can serve to inspire the 
following policy recommendations in Indonesia. 
They are based on the existing Indonesian system 
of forest classification and allowable land uses.
For-profit businesses should be allowed to build 
and manage eco-tourism facilities in conservation 
forests (hutan konservasi). These activities will 
support the preservation of ecosystems and 
biodiversity. 
Protection forests (hutan lindung) are meant to 
prevent floods, control erosion, and maintain 
soil fertility. For their sustainable management, 
usufructuary rights should be granted to local 
communities allowing them to manage these 
forests and giving them limited rights to access 
forest resources. 
Finally, production forests (hutan produksi), where 
timber and non-timber products can be extracted, 
should either be handed over to local communities 
or be privatized. The national government should 
move away from approaching those forest areas 
as a source of national state revenues. Instead, 
it should allow these resources to support local 
income generation and growth.
1
Existing data puts Indonesia’s forests in a critical 
situation. The marginal loss of forest cover has 
been increasing by an average of 47,600 hectares 
every year, reaching 840,000 hectares in 2012 
alone.1 As a result, Indonesia ranks number 6 of 
the top carbon dioxide emitting countries, and is 
the most intense greenhouse gas emitter globally.2
Despite the Indonesian government’s commitments 
to the international community and a 2011 
deforestation moratorium covering 43 million 
hectares of land3, the statistics above indicate 
that government efforts have done little to curb 
rates of deforestation4. So far, the country’s weak 
governance system combined with a lack of respect 
for the rule of law and an insufficient protection 
of property rights have hindered progress in 
sustainable forest management practices.
The policy directive TAP MPR IX/2001 is considered 
to be the most explicit and important legal statement 
on the governance of natural resources. It requires 
the government to review, rationalize and harmonize 
laws concerning the management of Indonesia’s 
natural resources.5 However, besides clearly 
stating the government’s dominance in governing 
forests and natural resources, the relevant laws 
remain vague and conflicting. This has invoked a 
struggle over forest resources between central and 
regional governments. 
Regional Autonomy Law 22/1999, born from 
the country’s rapid decentralization policy after 
the Suharto regime, initially granted district and 
municipal governments authority and responsibility 
over policy areas, such as environment, 
agriculture, and land, within their territories. 
Calls for more clearly defined roles of central 
and local governments led to the amended law 
32/2004. The new law was to create “harmonious 
relations between the Regions and the [central] 
Government”6 but it awarded the center and the 
provinces much influence and control over local 
governments through supervising and monitoring 
their decisions and policies7.  Latest plans of the 
Indonesian government will remove the rights from 
the 500 districts and municipalities and reallocate 
them to the provincial level. This has been strongly 
criticized by district governments.8 
According to Article 33 of the Indonesian 
constitution, “the earth and water and the natural 
resources contained within them are to be 
controlled by the state”.9 The Basic Agrarian Law 
of 1960 (BAL), and Forestry Law 41 of 1999 provide 
the central government with the explicit authority 
over all forests.10 BAL and Law 41/1999 grants the 
Environment and Forestry Ministry the authority to 
exercise forest utilization and management rights, 
while the National Land Agency (BPN) grants 
and recognizes rights over forestland (kawasan 
hutan)11.
According to Indonesian laws, all land identified 
as forestland falls under the authority of the 
Environment and Forestry Ministry while ‘non-forest 
areas’ or APL (area penggunaan lain) generally 
fall under the authority of district and municipal 
governments.12 The Indonesian government has 
further classified forestland as Conservation 
Forests (Hutan Konservasi13), Protection Forests 
(Hutan Lindung), and Production Forests (Hutan 
Produksi) in order to manage the use of state forest 
estates. This classification was done by consensus 
(“Paduserasi”) between local governments and the 
Environment and Forestry Ministry. The process 
resulted in the national government legally claiming 
120 million hectares as kawasan hutan or state-
owned forestland.
Background/Analysis
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National forest classification in Indonesia
Source: Anne Rosenbarger et al., How to change legal land use classifications to support more sustainable palm oil in Indonesia, World Resource 
Institute: Issue Brief, 2013, p.7.
Forest Classification Function14 Area (Ha)
Conservation Forest To preserve animal and plant biodiversity, and life sup-
porting ecosystems.
20,500,988
Protection Forest To prevent floods, control erosion, and maintain soil 
fertility.
33,519,600
Production Forests
Limited Production
Allows limited and selective extraction of timber and 
non-timber products
23,057,449
Permanent Production Allows production, including timber plantations, and the 
clear-cutting of forests
35,197,011
Convertible Production Allows plantations and can be converted into ‘non-forest 
areas’ for non-forestry activities
8,078,056
Total 120,353,104
Contrary to the results of the classification process, 
it has been estimated that 61% of that forestland 
has been inaccurately classified without properly 
defining and representing the ecosystems that 
actually exist on the ground.15 There are reported 
instances where forests with a high conservation 
value or land with high ecological significance have 
been classified as ‘non-forest areas’ (APL). On the 
other hand, land with severely degraded forests or 
no forests at all were classified as forestland.16
The sound management of Indonesia’s forest 
estates has been further convoluted and impeded 
by the lack of publicly available data about forest 
areas, by conflicting data of forest boundaries 
and types of forests within forest areas, by the 
lack of adequate and efficient procedures and 
mechanisms for the granting of land use permits, 
as well as by inconsistent goals for conversation 
efforts and the use of forest resources.17
Resulting classification errors as well as governance 
and management problems have led to the clear-
cutting of forests with high ecological value for 
the sake of palm oil plantations.18 Moreover, 
inaccurate forest mapping and overlapping forest 
governance rights have lead to disputes and 
even violence between authorities, the private 
sector, and local communities around and within 
forestland.19 Finally, ambiguous land demarcation 
and unclear designation of authority over forests 
have impacted spatial planning efforts by regional 
governments.20 This potentially undermined the 
sustainable management of regional industries 
and agriculture21.
A Case for Property Rights
Since the problems mentioned above are complex 
and take much time and effort to resolve, it is 
advisable to implement more feasible steps in the 
realm of property rights reforms in order to tackle 
Indonesia’s deforestation problem. The benefits 
of establishing protected property rights for the 
protection of the natural environment have long 
been established. There is a wealth of literature on 
actual property rights regimes and their effects on 
common property resources, such as forests, and 
on climate change.22
Property rights approaches to environmental 
protection are based on the belief in a strong 
correlation between secure property rights, local 
economic growth and environmental protection.23 
They are driven by the assumptions that a) 
economic actors seek their own individual benefit 
and welfare, and that b) only protected property 
rights allow them to turn their attention from short-
term to long-term benefits derived from natural 
resources. 
When local economic actors seek to raise their 
individual income and welfare they may over-exploit 
common resources, such as forests. They are more 
likely to do so, if the benefits of over-exploitation 
outweigh the risks and costs involved. If it pays 
4out, they act against existing rules and regulations 
for environmental protection seeking their own 
short-term benefit. Increasing alternative income 
opportunities, on the other hand, change the 
equation and make it less attractive for economic 
actors to break environmental regulations. As our 
case studies in the following chapter point out, they 
will be more likely to engage in less exploitative 
economic activities, such as ecofriendly tourism 
services.  
Unprotected property rights are the other 
main reason why individuals, corporations and 
communities over-exploit resources for their 
short-term benefit. These short-term interests are 
generally the reason for exploitation practices that 
cause the degradation and depletion of Indonesian 
forests. In contrast, reliable property rights regimes 
raise the confidence of populations living around 
and within forests to invest in sustainable forest 
management practices and innovations to increase 
their long-term benefit from natural resources.24 In 
addition, protected property rights also provide 
actors with access to financial markets. As such, 
property rights provide a ‘safety net’ that reduces 
risks and vulnerability from unexpected external 
shocks.25
When comparing international levels of property 
rights protection26, Indonesia only ranked 59 out 
of 97 countries in the International Property Rights 
Index (IPRI) of 2014 (Table 2). The index disclosed 
severe shortcomings in the independence of 
the Indonesian judiciary, the rule of law, and the 
control of corruption in the country. These factors 
aggravate problems resulting from governance 
issues In Indonesia that were described earlier 
in this paper. All together culminate in a strong 
predicament of local governments that actually 
seek to reduce deforestation and environmental 
degradation.
Table 2
Indonesia’s Ranking in the International Property Rights Index (2014)
Source: ‘Report: Indonesia’, The International Property Rights Index, 2014
Category Global Ranking Indicators27
Overall 59 out of 97 countries
Judicial Independence 53/97 Judiciary independent from political influence or members 
of government, citizens, or firms.
Rule of Law 66/97 Combines several indicators, including judicial independ-
ence, respect for law in relations between citizens and the 
administration, property rights, confidence in the police 
force, enforceability of contracts, direct financial fraud, law 
and order.
Control of Corruption 73/97 Combines several indicators, which measure the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests.
The district of Wonosobo in Central Java 
provides an example for this predicament. The 
district government regards most programs by 
central government agencies as ill informed and 
uncoordinated. The Environment and Forestry 
Ministry, for instance, supplies regular cash to 
villagers who are supposed to buy and plant tree 
seedlings. These handouts are not subject to any 
impact assessment and merely create expectations 
by the farmers for short-term cash payouts. Local 
officials regard these programs as undermining 
the preparedness of villagers to participate in long-
term sustainability programs.28
The struggle between central and local 
governments is being aggravated by property 
rights issues, for example in the case of Buntu 
village on the Dieng Plateau, which stretches into 
the boundaries of Wonosobo district. It is an area 
of ecological importance for its river systems and 
it holds economic development potential in the 
form of geothermal power and its attractiveness 
for tourists. The district government has previously 
held awareness campaigns in villages on the Dieng 
5Plateau. They managed to raise awareness for the 
importance of local forests as they reduce the risk 
of floods and landslides in this mountainous area. 
However, the production forests (hutan produksi) 
on the Dieng Plateau are under the authority of the 
central government’s Environment and Forestry 
Ministry and are managed by its state-owned 
forestry corporation, Perum Perhutani. When Perum 
Perhutani announced it would cut down trees 
for timber production, villagers in Buntu, which 
borders these forests, vehemently objected to the 
operation through a formal petition to the district 
government.29 They expressed their concern that 
deforestation on the hills surrounding their village 
might result in floods and landslides.
It’s a positive sign that villagers are more aware of 
environmental risks brought about by deforestation. 
However, the forests around Buntu village are 
being managed by the central government 
through its state-owned company and the district 
government is losing its authority to the provincial 
administration. If the forests were to be managed 
by the village itself it would serve to protect Buntu 
village and the environment of the Dieng Plateau 
and it would transfer income opportunities from 
Perum Perhutani to this small village in the heart 
of Java. 
Property rights reforms have enhanced sustainable 
resource management in a number of cases 
around the world. These cases demonstrate how 
property rights reforms can prevent deforestation 
and encourage reforestation.30
Stronger Community Involvement 
as Alternative Models 
for Forest Management
There are successful experiences in poor 
communities worldwide that prove how community 
and private sector involvement can be a viable 
path for sustainable forest management and 
income generation for low-income households. 
The following cases are just a sample of those that 
inspire their potential replication as well as wider 
policy recommendations for Indonesia. 
Community Forest Management in Nepal
The community forest management program 
in Nepal is considered to be a success story 
for reforestation and improved livelihoods. It 
has increased rural household incomes and it 
safeguarded the ecology of their forestlands. A 
study of datasets from 55 forests on the middle hills 
and the Terai plains of Nepal observed a significant 
degree of reforestation after large-scale forest 
clearing had happened in the past. The study 
confirmed that the Nepalese land tenure regime 
and local monitoring were of central importance for 
this successful reforestation.31
Underpinning Nepal’s success has been a well-
defined legal and regulatory framework with a 
Master Plan for the Forestry Sector that recognized 
the importance of local community participation. 
The Forest Act of 1993 recognized the rights 
of local communities to take full control over 
state-owned forests under a community forest 
management scheme. The Act provided village 
residents with the authority to make management 
decisions regarding forest resources. A series of 
government guidelines and directives clarified the 
role of community forest user groups (CFUGs) and 
guided the implementation of community forestry. 
They specified restrictions on forest usage and 
occasionally also on certain species. In short, 
the state remains the owner of the forests but the 
communities hold the rights to use and manage 
the forests.32
Essentially the Act of 1993 identified local peoples 
6as CFUGs and afforded them the right of self-
governance, forest management and utilization. 
Based on this policy and the recognition of 
community rights, Nepal’s Ministry of Forest and 
Soil Conservation dropped its traditional policing 
role and turned into a facilitator of community 
institutions.33
By 2009, Nepal’s community forest management 
program included 1.6 million people, or one third 
of Nepal’s population. They managed 1 million 
hectares, or a quarter of Nepal’s state forests34. As 
a result, a study shows CFUGs have increased the 
average annual household income of forest user 
from USD 710 in 2003 to USD 1,512 in 2008 through 
forest-based products such as spices and resin, to 
name just a few.35 The generation of more income 
went along with the creation of community-based 
forestry enterprises with 90 percent of employment 
going to those from poor or very poor households.36 
Moreover, access to a range of forest resources 
has allowed households to diversify their incomes, 
which reduced their dependency on one particular 
forest product and the risks associated with the 
volatility of particular commodity prices. 
Meanwhile, there are several other effects of the 
Nepalese forest management system on rural 
livelihoods. A profit-sharing scheme has enabled 
CFUGs to fund public infrastructure projects 
such a power plants and watershed management 
facilities.37 Through this, Nepal’s community forest 
management program has fostered ‘inclusive 
growth’ and also democratic participation on a 
grassroots level. CFUGs are constituted to include 
participation from all households; their management 
and operations require input from all individuals. 
This empowered traditionally marginalized groups, 
such as women whose participation in CFUG 
Executive Committees increased from 15 women 
(77 men) at the time when the committees were 
formed to a total of 43 women (78 men) in 2008.38
In short and most importantly, what sustains the 
community forest management system in Nepal 
is its tenure security. It is this secure access to 
forest resources that encourages communities to 
maintain sustainable practices and to invest time 
and efforts into forest management.39
Usufructuary Rights and Tree Ownership in 
Niger
Land regeneration and community forestry have 
created another success story in the Sahel region 
of Africa.40 Many had perceived the desertification 
of Niger’s agricultural land as irreversible after 
it had been hit by deforestation and severe 
drought during the 1970s -1980s. Today, 5-6 
million additional hectares of land are covered 
by trees - all as a result of farmer incentives and 
community efforts. According to the World Bank, 
the “transition from state ownership of trees to de 
facto recognition of individual property rights” was 
key to this transformation.41 What happened?
Since before the independence of Niger, trees 
and all forest resources were owned by the state.42 
The Forest Code of 1974 regulated all matters in 
‘classified’ and ‘protected’ forests of Niger but 
government lists of protected trees went beyond 
the forest domain and included the economically 
most valuable tree species in the entire country. 
Without any rights on their own, farmers came to 
see the trees as obstacles on their farms and they 
also had to fear being fined or even imprisoned if 
caught harvesting any tree products. In addition, as 
theft of trees was rampant, farmers also preferred 
to harvest the trees themselves instead of losing 
the wood to others. 
This attitude only changed when desperations in 
Niger escalated after severe droughts and famines 
in the early 1970s and 1980s. With the introduction 
of the farmer-managed natural regeneration 
(FMNR) system in the early 1980s farmers began 
to abandon traditional farming techniques and 
allowed trees in their fields to regrow, which 
produced food, fodder, fuelwood, and other goods. 
FMNR is basically a low-cost, sustainable land-
restoration technique that involves the systematic 
regeneration and management of trees and shrubs 
from tree stumps, roots and seeds. 
Given the success of the FMNR system, the 
government of Niger began to discuss rural land 
and natural resource tenure issues and gradually 
changed the legislative framework. In 1993 it 
formulated ‘Principles for a new Rural Code’ that 
strengthened local rights to protect, manage, 
harvest and benefit from on-farm trees.43 The 
Forestry Code of 2004 did not establish individual 
or community ownership of trees but it formally 
recognized the right to use forest resources. 
This was generally understood as the de facto 
recognition of individual property rights.
From a land tenure perspective, the government 
had moved to recognize the communities’ 
“usufructuary” rights44 to forests resources. With the 
new forestry code it responded to pro-environmental 
beliefs among local communities45 and it started 
to encourage farmers and communities to take 
on tree planting and engage in sustainable forest 
management. The accompanying transformation 
of Niger’s state Forestry Services from the enforcer 
of forest usage restrictions to a facilitator of 
community participation sent further signaled 
to farmers that it is worth their time and effort to 
nurture trees on their land. 
Since 90 percent of Niger’s population live off 
agriculture, the benefits of nurturing trees has 
helped even the poorest communities. According 
to some estimates, the application of FMNR and the 
granting of usufructuary rights in Niger led to 200 
million new trees on 5 million hectares of farmland 
which produces 500,000 tons more grain and 
USD 56 more benefits per hectare per year. The 
improvement of soil, animal fodder and firewood 
supplies has improved the life of an estimated 2.5 
million people in Niger.46
The factors that have allowed successful land 
regeneration in Niger have been that a) farmers 
themselves were involved and initiate their own 
innovations that are most suitable for their lands; 
b) strong community or village support through 
institutions and local leadership; and c) secure 
property rights over forest resources, whether it be 
usufructuary rights or full ownership. 
Community-Based Plantation Forests in 
Gunungkidul, Indonesia
Since the government generally owns all 
Indonesian forests, community forestry has only 
been applied on a very limited scale and only on 
land specifically designated by the Environment 
and Forestry Ministry for community forestry. This 
includes the district of Gunungkidul outside the 
city of Yogyakarta.47 The area of Gunungkidul 
was once a degraded and arid area from years 
of deforestation. It has since been reforested 
with tree plantations, which have been grown by 
cooperatives of smallholders. 
According to Law 25/1992 Indonesian cooperatives 
are legal entities whose members cooperate for 
their economic betterment and this also guides the 
plantation cooperatives in their business decisions. 
Some cooperatives, such as Koperasi Wana 
Manunggal Lestari and Koperasi Wana Lestari 
Menoreh in Gunungkidul, choose sustainable 
plantation practices and gained sustainable forestry 
certification from the Indonesian Ecolabelling 
Institute (Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia) for their 
timber products. This allows them to sell certified 
timber at prices that are 10-15% higher than those 
of uncertified producers.48
Farmers in Gunungkidul derive most of their short-
term income from agricultural crops and animal 
husbandry. They look to their trees as assets and 
keep them as some sort of long-term savings 
deposits.49 If they wait for a tree to grow mature, 
it can fetch around 4 million Indonesian Rupiah 
(USD 300). However, farmers from low-income 
households often cannot wait and cut their trees 
when extra cash is needed. Thus, the access 
to formal credit schemes is important for the 
sustainability of smallholders’ timber plantations50 
Cooperatives like Koperasi Wana Lestari Menoreh 
work with local credit providers such as Credit 
Union Kharisma Taliasih that provide loans of up to 
60 percent of the tree value.51
While some cooperatives in Gunungkidul focus 
entirely on sustainable timber plantations, others, 
such as Koperasi Serikat Petani Pembaharu, also 
grow fruit tree plantations that, besides the revenues 
from fruit harvests, also serve the additional aim of 
preventing landslides and maintaining groundwater 
levels. The collaboration of both cooperatives in 
Gunungkidul created 40 hectares of certified wood 
plantations in 2012 and the intercropping of trees 
help provide short-term income.52
With sound management production capacities, 
Gunungkidul provides an example how certified 
timber plantations, together with other short-term 
crops, enhance land regeneration and long-term 
incomes of the households involved.53 Similar to the 
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international experiences mentioned above, the 
involvement of communities in Indonesia proves to 
be vital for sustainable forest management.
Public Private Partnership in Kinabalu Park, 
Malaysia
The Kinabalu Park covers an area of 754 square 
kilometers around Mount Kinabalu in Malaysia. In 
2000, UNESCO granted it the status of a World 
Heritage Site because of its global importance as 
a ‘Centre of Plant Endemism’ with an outstanding 
range of naturally functioning ecosystems. 
According to the UNESCO, the park “remains in 
an excellent state of conservation”, even though 
the UNESCO identified significant threats, such 
as adjacent land uses, encroachment, a need for 
capacity building, etc.54
Since conservation is such a fundamental challenge 
to national parks in Indonesia and elsewhere, it is 
worthwhile to discuss the reasons for the successful 
conservation of the Kinabalu Park. The park is 
being overseen and managed by the Malaysian 
government through the Sabah Parks organization. 
In 1998, it was decided to privatize the park’s hotel 
accommodation, restaurants and souvenir shops in 
order to improve tourism facilities. A 30-year lease 
agreement was granted to a private company to 
reduce the burden of the state government in terms 
of administration, financial and human resources. 
The Kinabalu Park has since been a public-private 
partnership.55 The government monitors and 
manages the conservation of the park while the 
private sector develops and maintains the tourism 
facilities.
The privatization of the tourism facilities in Kinabalu 
Park aimed to increase revenue generation 
from park visitors. Improvements in the tourism 
business were also to create jobs for the local 
population, and the increased number of park 
visitors was to develop more businesses in external 
areas adjacent to the park. This improvement 
of the livelihood of local communities through 
employment and business opportunities as well 
as infrastructure development is important for the 
conservation of the park’s ecosystems. It potentially 
reduces the illegal logging and the encroachment 
and clearing of forestland by local communities for 
crop production and grazing, which all constitute 
severe threats for forest conservation.56
An academic assessment several years after the 
privatization of the tourism facilities found that 
revenues generated from eco-tourism did not 
channel funds into conservation–related research 
and training programs. Instead, the money went 
into the development and improvement of new 
tourism-related facilities and activities.57 However, 
the assumption that tourism revenues should 
be spent on conservation expenses fails to fully 
acknowledge the benefits of this public-private 
partnership. The generation of revenues for park 
conservation is only a minor function of private 
sector involvement. More importantly, the profit-
orientation of a rational and effectively operating 
private tourism company provides the best 
incentives to keep natural ecosystems in pristine 
conditions. 
This should also include the incentive for the 
private company to contribute to the livelihood of 
the local communities. However, the same study 
of the tourism facilities in the Kinabalu Park that 
was mentioned above also lamented that local 
communities did not report an increase in job 
opportunities. They were rather found worrying 
about their job security after being employed by a 
private company. Moreover, they reported they did 
not participate in the local economic development 
in other ways than being employed.58 This is indeed 
a reason for concern because of the importance of 
local community involvement for the prevention of 
their encroachment into conservation forests. 
Another reason for concern in the Kinabalu Park 
management, are reported cases of monopolistic 
behavior by the firm that operates the tourist 
facilities. There was no open bidding process 
when the firm was selected in 1998 and signed 
the 30-year lease agreement.59 The lesson learnt 
is that the involvement of the private sector must 
avoid monopolizing services and should, instead, 
allow for open competition of service providers. A 
lack of competition from other businesses can lead 
to monopolistic pricing and the quality of services 
and goods will not meet visitor expectations. 
All in all, however, even decades after Kinabalu was 
declared a national park in 1964, the UNESCO still 
lauds the excellence of Kinabalu Park. It stated that 
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“threats from encroachment remain minimal” due to 
levels of patrolling and clearly defined and marked 
boundaries of the park.60 In this statement UNESCO 
overlooks the importance of the local communities 
but the fact that there is little encroachment into 
the conservation forest proves they are able to 
making a living without exploiting forest resources 
and harming precarious ecosystems. The tourism 
business in Malaysia certainly contributes to that 
end.
Policy Recommendations
Considering the complexities of Indonesia’s weak 
legal framework and forests governance, a top-
down approach is unlikely to lead to sustainable 
forest management and the prevention of 
further deforestation. As cases around the world 
have indicated, successful efforts to prevent 
deforestation and to manage forests sustainably 
come from grassroots communities living around 
and within forest areas. They need the government 
to grant them secure access to forest resources. As 
we have seen in examples mentioned previously, 
it is only after communities have acquired secure 
access through property rights, that communities 
are confident to commit to long-term investment 
into sustainable forestry practices, and stimulate 
rural economies. 
Indonesia’s moratorium on deforestation provides 
an opportunity to improve and strengthen the legal 
framework and governance of the country’s forests. 
The recommendations below take advantage of 
this opportunity and provide alternative models 
that afford property rights to local communities and 
the private sector allowing them to engage in, and 
contribute to sustainable forest management. The 
policy recommendations follow the classification of 
Indonesian forests according to Law 41/1999 on 
Forestry. 
Attract for-profit businesses to build and manage 
eco-tourism facilities within conservation 
forests (Hutan Konservasi)
As the laws allow for limited tourism in conservation 
forests, we suggest attracting for-profit businesses 
to develop tourism infrastructure and services with 
minimal environmental impact, such as nature tour 
guides, souvenir shops, walkways, restaurants, 
and accommodation for park visitors. 
Since government institutions do not have the 
capacity in terms of expertise, funds and human 
resources to manage such services, the entry 
of for-profit businesses provide additional job 
opportunities for local communities in areas around 
the forests. They start their own business, become 
tour operators, or get employed in hospitality 
services. Tourism companies also help collecting 
conservation fees that increase revenues for the 
government’s conservation agenda. 
The process of negotiating long-term contracts 
between government, businesses, and local 
communities provides an opportunity for all 
parties to find a legally binding settlement on land 
demarcation, and their scope of work. This sets into 
motion the process of designating park boundaries 
where businesses and local communities can or 
cannot operate.
In learning from the case of the Kinabalu Park, 
a public private partnership must allow multiple 
operators to compete in a fair and transparent 
procurement process that, in the end, will ensure 
affordable access for Indonesian visitors and 
a sufficient quality of services. Government 
institutions must have clear conservation goals 
and indicators to properly guide their negotiations 
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with businesses and local communities. Combined 
efforts of both, the public and the private sector, 
towards proper spatial planning within and around 
forest boundaries will allow local populations to 
attract visitors to the forests, to create businesses, 
and to make a living out of secured and well 
conserved forest areas. 
Afford local community cooperatives with 
usufructuary rights to manage protection 
forests (Hutan Lindung)
Protection forests support ecological systems that 
prevent floods, control erosion, and maintain soil 
fertility. In order to improve the function of these 
forests, we suggest that local communities are 
given usufructuary rights or limited tenure rights to 
manage those forest resources. The example from 
Niger has indicated that the mere perception of 
farmers and local cultivators reaping secure long-
term benefits from forest resources was enough 
to encourage sustainable practices that enabled 
them to regrow their trees, generate income, and 
stimulate growth of the local economies. 
The case of community forestry in Nepal suggests 
that the local population needs to get organized 
in legally recognized committees or cooperatives 
in order to engage in community-based forest 
management. These cooperatives involve 
members of each household as ‘shareholders’ and 
they appoint local leaders to guide the group’s 
cultivation activities and harvests. 
Such cooperatives have several legal precedents 
in Indonesia in the form of community forests 
(Hutan Rakyat). Expanding the scope of community 
forestry can begin with communities that already 
manage forest areas efficiently on a de facto basis. 
Granting them limited land tenure rights provides 
them with the legal security to sustainably manage 
and use forest resources.
Grant community ownership or privatize 
production forests (Hutan Produksi)
The Environment and Forestry Ministry should 
move away from seeing production forests as a 
source of state revenue. 
Instead, forests that are designated for timber 
plantations should either be privatized or 
afforded to community cooperatives in order to 
stimulate the growth of rural economies, like in 
the case of Gunungkidul. Here, the involvement 
of community cooperatives carried the additional 
benefit of involving local households in value-
added industries for wood-based products, and 
it encouraged greater financial inclusion through 
access to financial services. 
Granting local communities long-term leasehold 
also gives them legal security against threats from 
external parties. The case of Buntu village on 
the Dieng Plateau in Central Java illustrates this 
point as villagers feared for their safety due to the 
planned activities of the state-owned company 
Perum Perhutani. Given their higher levels of 
awareness for the protective role of local forests, 
local communities are in a better position than the 
national government or its state-owned company 
to make decisions on the appropriate amount of 
logging and the sustainable use of other forest 
resources.
In any case, the accurate classification of 
forestland is of paramount importance and must 
be accompanying any reform effort. In the case 
of Buntu village, the villagers understand the 
importance of local forests for the protection 
against floods and landslides but the forests are 
legally classified as production forests, which 
allows for their total clearance. Especially in the 
case of production forests, there must be an audit 
of land to ensure that the classification is accurate 
and does not contain forests with a protective 
function or a high conservation value.
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